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 Toward a Post-Arctic World 
by Barry S. Zellen 
Strategic Insights is a quarterly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
The period between the Cold War’s end, and the current period of rapid climate change, was a 
quiet period in the field of Arctic security studies—inter-state tensions across the Arctic basin 
dramatically shrunk after the Soviet collapse, and concerns over external Arctic security shifted to 
the back burner during most of the 90s. During this period, another dimension of Arctic security 
accelerated to the front burner—the internal dimension—as a tremendous transformation came to 
fruition, integrating the largely indigenous Arctic into the constitutional and economic framework 
of the modern state. 
Associated with this transformation was the increased recognition of environmental security as a 
pillar of national security, and the importance of inter-ethnic harmony to internal stability, two 
issues that had festered beneath the surface in the former Soviet Union and contributed to the 
rapid implosion of that multi-ethnic state, and which still present a great challenge to Russia. In 
North America, these two trends in the diversification of our definition of security were fostered by 
several events, including the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill; the 1990 armed stand-off at Oka; and 
the intensifying ethnic conflict and consequent state collapse in the former Yugoslavia. In the 
Arctic, the environmental legacy of the Cold War also contributed to the “greening” of northern 
security, as toxins associated with the DEW Line and the mothballed Soviet fleet raised deep 
concerns, and a variety of air- and sea-borne pollutants originating thousands of miles to the 
south entered the Arctic food chain, concentrating in the fatty tissues of marine mammals, and 
directly affecting the health of the Inuit.  
The Land Claims Journey  
In North America, tremendous structural innovations were made to the Arctic’s political economy, 
stretching from the Bering Sea to Baffin Bay, with the completion of a generation-long process of 
negotiating comprehensive Aboriginal land claims treaties to resolve issues of land ownership, 
and to foster an enduring partnership between the indigenous peoples and the state through a 
variety of new institutions, including Aboriginal regional and community corporations, investment 
corporations, land administration agencies, a variety of tribe-state co-management boards, plus a 
complex patchwork of local, regional and territorial governments created to give a voice to the 
Native interest.  
The general trend across the North American Arctic has been to first address the land question, 
and to negotiate and implement land claims accords to bring clarity of title, serving two distinct 
and important goals: to protect the local tribal interest and provide a resource base for economic 
development as well as a land base to protect subsistence harvesting of wildlife; and to enable 
economic development projects such as oil and gas pipelines to proceed. Once land claims were 
settled across the region, the next step in the process of northern development has been, 
generally speaking, the pursuit of new systems of Aboriginal self-governance, taking various 
forms and employing various structures, whether to establish municipal or borough governments 
under existing constitutional law; to create tribal councils governed by federal Indian law; or to 
negotiate new systems—the most ambitious and expansive to date being the still young territory 
of Nunavut, with a comprehensive land claim settlement linked to the subsequent formation of a 
new territorial government, creating a complex but very powerful system of self-governance 
applying a public model to a predominantly indigenous region where 85% of the population is 
Inuit.  
After Nunavut, the evolution toward more properly indigenous self-governing structures has 
continued, as reflected in the Labrador Inuit Land Claim of 2005 with the very first truly 
indigenous self-governing structure, articulated in detail in the 2002 Labrador Inuit Constitution. 
More recently, in November 2008, the far-flung Danish province of Greenland held a referendum 
on evolving beyond their “home rule” system of autonomy toward more formal sovereignty and 
independence, which passed decisively.  
Regardless of the jurisdiction, whether Alaska or Arctic Canada, indigenous peoples have shown 
tremendous ingenuity in their effort to build new systems for self-governance, creatively adapting 
existing institutions or creating new ones when possible, lobbying for and negotiating to further 
advance the powers of Aboriginal self-governance.  
Breaking the Ice  
The Arctic Security Project at the Center for Contemporary Conflict has been examining this 
continuing social and political transformation of the North, looking at the way history has unfolded 
across the Arctic, and at how ideas and institutions for reconciling the interests of indigenous 
northerners and the modern state have evolved, along a west-to-east arc, becoming stronger with 
each new iteration and reversing many of the negative consequences of the colonial experience, 
and transforming the domestic balance of power to lean heavily in favor of tribal interests, 
particularly on social and economic matters, and to a limited degree on security matters. This 
increasing shift in power has increased the capacity for the indigenous peoples of the North to 
confront the many social and economic challenges that remain in their communities, providing the 
tools necessary to face the emergent challenges and opportunities associated with climate 
change, and a potential Arctic thaw.  
Social conditions in Alaska and the Canadian Arctic have been described as a “Fourth World,” 
with Third World conditions exacerbated by climate, isolation, limited infrastructure including a 
near absence of roads and rail networks—making seasonal ice roads and summer sea lifts an 
economic lifeline. Communities are generally quite small, ranging from a few dozen people to 
several hundred with the larger centers being home to just a few thousand people; their 
populations are predominantly indigenous, with subsistence hunting, fishing and trapping still 
essential to their nutritional and cultural survival.  
Unemployment remains high, local educational opportunities vary greatly, housing shortages 
persist, energy costs are high, but with the movement from land claim settlement to the 
achievement of self-governance, there is hope and opportunity to address and resolve these 
challenges—though much uncertainty remains, particularly with new challenges from climate 
change entering the mix. Economic opportunities remain limited, with natural resource 
development presenting one of the more enduring opportunities, from last century’s Klondike gold 
rush to the Oil boom of the 1970s, to the Diamond rush of the 1990s, to the new race to 
demarcate the Arctic’s offshore boundaries. Land claims have helped to ensure that when 
economic development does take place, local concerns and tribal interests are not overlooked, 
with indigenous leaders becoming governing partners in assessing environmental risk, mitigating 
impacts to traditional subsistence, and ensuring economic participation through jobs, training, and 
resource royalties.  
The settlement of land claims and emergence of new structures of self-government have 
increased the role of indigenous peoples in the decisions made about the Arctic and its future. 
One dramatic illustration: in the 1970s, when the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry was held by 
Justice Berger, the struggle was primarily between corporate interests and tribal interests, with 
the latter excluded from the decision-making of the former. During the current Mackenzie Gas 
Project, the Aboriginal Pipeline Group sits with the oil companies as an Aboriginally-owned equity 
partner; and the Joint Review Panel examining the environmental and social impacts of the 
proposed pipeline is empowered by the settled regional land claims, providing an indigenous 
perspective to both sides.  
ANCSA: Starting the Process  
When the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (or ANCSA) was enacted, it aimed to 
quickly bring Alaska Natives into the modern economy, and at the same time to clarify the limits 
of Aboriginal title, making it possible to fully develop the state’s natural resources and in particular 
to build the trans- Alaska pipeline. Because its objectives were largely economic, its corporate 
model became its defining and most transformative characteristic.  
ANCSA formally extinguished Aboriginal rights, title, and claims to traditional lands in the state, 
while formally transferring fee-simple title to 44 million acres—or some 12% of the state’s land 
base—to Alaska Natives, with $962.5 million in compensation for the lands ceded to the state, 
$500 million of which was to be derived from future oil royalties. It also created 12 regional Native 
corporations (and later a 13th for non-resident Alaska Natives), and over 200 village corporations 
to manage these lands and financial resources.  
These new corporate structures introduced a brand new language and culture, as well as a new 
system of managing lands and resources that seemed at variance with the traditional cultures of 
the region and their traditional subsistence economy. The early years of ANCSA were famously 
described by justice Thomas Berger as dragging Alaska Natives “kicking and screaming” into the 
20th century.  
In addition to the “corporatization” of village Alaska, ANCSA also had some structural flaws that 
almost proved fatal to the land claims experience, including a 20-year moratorium in transferring 
shares in Native corporations to non-Natives, which many feared would inevitably result in the 
dilution of Native ownership, known as the “1991 Time Bomb.” While critics of the land claims 
process are correct to point out these original structural flaws and the assimilating pressures 
introduced by new corporate structures, the land claims model has nonetheless proved resilient 
and adaptive, as Native corporations matured and their boards, managers and shareholders 
found ways to balance traditional and modern values.  
The IFA: Evolving the Model  
Across the border, the Inuvialuit of the Western Canadian Arctic had a front row seat to ANCSA, 
and were impressed by the tangible economic benefits of the corporate structures created, as 
well as sizeable cash compensation and land quantum transferred to Alaska Natives. But they 
also noted continuing threat to indigenous culture, and the lack of adequate protections of 
subsistence rights, traditional culture, and environmental protection, and were determined to do 
better.  
Figure 1: ANCSA and Alaska’s New Corporate Geography  
 
So when land claims crossed from Alaska into the Northwest Territories in 1984 with the passage 
of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA), the land claims model became significantly enhanced—in 
addition to creating new Native corporations, the IFA also made an equal institutional 
commitment to the preservation of Native culture and traditions, to preserve the land and the 
wildlife, and to empower not just new corporate interests but also traditional cultural interests as 
well, by creating new institutions of co-management. The Inuvialuit successfully modified the land 
claims concept, so that its structure included a natural institutional balancing—not unlike our own 
balance of powers concept.  
Their land claim entitled the Inuvialuit to 35,000 square miles of land; co-management of land and 
water use, wildlife, and environmental assessment; wildlife harvesting rights; financial 
compensation of $45 million in 1978 dollars, inflation-adjusted to $162 million, for lands ceded to 
Canada; and a share of government royalties for oil, gas, and mineral development on federal 
land, and a commitment to meaningful economic participation.  
But one issue that was not yet on the table in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Inuvialuit 
chose to pursue their own regional land claim—and thereby gain some control over the intense oil 
boom in their homeland—was the establishment of new institutions of Aboriginal self-government, 
something that the Inuit of the central and eastern Arctic—the future Nunavut territory—decided 
to wait for.  
Figure 2: The Inuvialuit Land Claims: Transforming the Model 
 Nunavut : Augmenting Land Claims with Political Power  
In the years separating the signing of the Inuvialuit land claim in 1984, and the signing of the 
Nunavut land claim in 1993, much progress was made on the political question, and an 
increasing respect for Aboriginal rights in Ottawa, enabling the establishment of a new concept: 
reshaping political boundaries to correspond to a land-claims settlement area, and establishing a 
new government to administer this region.  
In 1993, with their signing of their historic accord, the Inuit of Nunavut were awarded $1.148 
billion to be distributed over 14 years, and an additional $13 million Training Trust Fund to 
prepare for hundreds of new government jobs, plus title to 135,000 square miles of land including 
13,600 with subsurface rights, on top of various co-management boards and clearly defined rights 
protecting subsistence and ensuring royalty sharing from resource development activities.  
But the most striking innovation of the Nunavut claim was the way it was linked to the division of 
the Northwest Territories and the formation of a brand new territory, resulting in the 1999 birth of 
Nunavut. Nunavut is now up and running, gaining valuable experience in self-governance. While 
facing many social and economic challenges—and some unexpected friction with Ottawa over 
implementation—there is still much reason for hope for the future.  
Nunavut has a population of around 30,000 in 28 communities spread out across over 770,000 
square miles, or one fifth of Canada’s land mass, including the High Arctic islands and the 
central-arctic coastal mainland. While its population is tiny, its jurisdiction is vast and its resource 
base potentially tremendous. And since its population is predominantly Inuit, a public government 
can govern in an indigenous style, as the principles of the Nunavut land claim and the governing 
power of the new territorial government mutually reinforce one another. 
Figure 3: Nunavut is Born: Augmenting Land Claims with Political Power  
 
In Alaska, many decades earlier, the Inupiat of the North Slope worked within the structural limits 
of the Alaska State Constitution to create their own municipal borough government, similarly 
leveraging existing constitutional law to create a public government that could nonetheless 
govern in a uniquely indigenous fashion, funded by the continuous stream of property taxes 
levied on the Alaska Pipeline, whose northern terminus was within its jurisdiction. But Nunavut 
went even further, standing up not just a municipal-level structure; its formation, by secession 
from the Northwest Territories, created a new and uniquely powerful territorial government. (The 
Inupiat have, in the years since creating their own borough government, considered their own 
secession from the state of Alaska—a notion that alarmed the Governor’s office in the early 
1990s when fears of “Balkanization” gripped much of the world, and Juneau became concerned 
that if the Inupiat acted upon their threat to secede from the state, they could take most of the 
state’s revenues along with them.)   
After Nunavut: Nunatsiavut and the Re-Emergence of Inuit Governance  
Half a decade later, the final Inuit land claim along the North American Arctic and Subarctic 
littoral—the Labrador Inuit (Nunatsiavut) Land Claims Agreement—was settled. It was decisively 
ratified on December 6, 2004 with a 76% yes vote, and came into effect nearly a year later on 
December 1, 2005, presenting a new stage in the evolution of Inuit governance, and redefining 
the limits of self-government within a land settlement area—transcending the public model 
applied by the Inuit of Nunavut and the Inupiat of the North Slope by forming truly indigenous 
structures for self-governance.  
This completed a journey that began in Alaska a generation earlier, and which resulted in the 
emergence of the first truly indigenous government serving an Inuit jurisdiction, and 
corresponding to a land settlement area. In contrast to Nunavut and the earlier North Slope 
Borough, Nunatsiavut is an explicitly ethnic government, serving the coastal communities of the 
rugged Labrador coast with their predominantly Inuit populations. The agreement created the 
28,000 square mile Labrador Inuit Settlement Area (LISA) with an adjoining 18,800 square mile 
ocean zone extending as far as Canada’s territorial waters. The LISA includes Labrador Inuit 
Lands (LILs), five predominantly Inuit communities, and 3,700 square miles set aside for the 
Torngat Mountains National Park Reserve (following a tradition established by prior Inuit land 
claims that created vast national parks in which subsistence was protected)—with the Inuit 
retaining special rights in each of these areas.  
Within the LISA, Inuit own 6,100 square miles of LILs, on which Inuit have the most rights and 
benefits, including exclusive right to carving stone and ownership of 1,525 square miles of quarry 
materials. The Government of Canada will pay the Labrador Inuit $140 million in 1997 dollars, 
according to a 15-year payment schedule, from which the Inuit will repay their negotiation loans 
totaling some $50 million over the same period (also following a tradition established by the 
earlier settlement areas). The Nunatsiavut Government is entitled to receive 25 per cent of 
provincial government revenues from subsurface resources in the LILs; in the LISA outside the 
LILs, the Nunatsiavut Government will receive 50 per cent of the first $2 million and five per cent 
of any additional provincial revenues from subsurface resources, much like the other settlement 
areas. (Revenues received from subsurface resources in the Settlement Area outside the LILs 
will be capped at an amount that, if distributed equally among all Labrador Inuit, would result in an 
average per capita income for Labrador Inuit that equals the Canadian average per capita 
income.) Further, the Nunatsiavut Government will receive five per cent of provincial revenues 
from subsurface resources in the Voisey’s Bay area.  
As in other land settlement areas, Inuit impacts and benefits agreements (IBAs) must be 
negotiated between the Nunatsiavut Government and developers before major economic 
development projects may proceed on LILs, in the broader LISA outside of LILs, and in the 
offshore coastal marine zone. Labrador Inuit have the right to harvest wildlife and plants for Inuit 
food, social and ceremonial purposes throughout the LISA, and if conservation requires that 
harvesting by Labrador Inuit be limited, the limits will be set by the provincial or federal minister, 
based on a recommendation of the Nunatsiavut Government. (A co-management board 
appointed by the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Government of Canada and 
the Nunatsiavut Government was established as the primary body for making recommendations 
to governments on conservation and game management in the LISA, while the provincial and 
federal governments will retain overall responsibility. Provisions have been made for non-Inuit 
with existing cabins in LILs to harvest in areas they traditionally and currently use. In addition, 
non-Inuit Labradorians harvesting in tidal waters for non-commercial purposes may establish 
temporary camps and cut firewood along the shoreline of LILs. The Nunatsiavut Government will 
control Inuit harvesting for food, social and ceremonial purposes throughout the LISA.)  
As described in section 17.2, the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement “exhaustively sets out 
the law-making authorities and self-government rights of Inuit,” with the newly created 
Nunatsiavut Government being “responsible for intergovernmental affairs and relations between 
Inuit Government, and Canada or the Province, or both,” and to be governed by the “fundamental 
law of Inuit” as enunciated by the 2002 Labrador Inuit Constitution, and which pledged to respect 
“principles of democracy,” remain “financially accountable to Inuit,” and to implement “rules 
respecting conflict of interest.”  
Figure 4: Nunatsiavut: Toward Truly Inuit Self-Governance 
 
The constitution also provides for the “establishment of municipal governments in Labrador Inuit 
Lands by the Nunatsiavut Government,” as well as community corporations for Inuit residing 
outside the Settlement Area, and it defined “the relationships among the Nunatsiavut Government 
and Inuit Community Governments, municipal governments in Labrador Inuit Lands, and the Inuit 
Community Corporations,” binding the administrative mechanisms created by the land claim to 
the new structures of Inuit self-governance. The constitution also included an Inuit charter of 
human rights, recognized Inuit customary law and its application to “any matter within the 
jurisdiction and authority of the Nunatsiavut Government,” and embraced laws to protect Inuit 
culture and the Inuktitut language within its jurisdiction, including “laws to preserve, promote and 
develop Inuit spiritual beliefs, Inuit sacred knowledge and Inuit sacred sites,” “laws to preserve, 
promote and develop Inuit cultural heritage,” and “laws to preserve, promote and develop Inuit 
traditional knowledge.”  
The detailed articulation of Inuit constitutional precepts in the January 2002 Labrador Inuit 
Constitution filled 159 pages, creating a blueprint of Inuit values and a pathway to the rapid 
standing up of a truly Inuit system of government in a region that was predominantly Inuit 
(including mixed-blood Métis and Kablunangajuit residents) and both part of, and adjacent to, to 
Canada’s Maritime Provinces, along coastal waters of emergent strategic significance as the 
Arctic basin opens up to naval and commercial maritime traffic, and with active commercial and 
subsistence fisheries, known strategic mineral deposits such as the Voisey’s Bay project, and 
prospects of much future resource potential.   
Greenland and the Road to Sovereign Independence  
Elsewhere in the world, the land claims model, and its subsequent modifications and 
augmentations, has become an inspiration, proof positive of what can be gained through a 
determined, forward-looking effort to rebalance and modernize the relationship between the 
indigenous people of the North and the modern state. As with any land reform effort, changes in 
land tenure can have a profound impact on the domestic balance of power, shifting not just title to 
land, but the wealth created from that land, resulting in concentrations of economic power in the 
hands of a small indigenous population numbering in the thousands or tends of thousands. In 
Alaska and the Canadian Arctic, the Inuit have become owners of vast tracts of land, making 
them a landed elite with control over numerous economic, and increasingly, political levers. While 
not formally sovereign, they are poised to become increasingly influential stakeholders, partners 
in the consolidation of state sovereignty, and in the economic development of the northern frontier. 
A comparable situation exists in the post-Ottoman Middle East, with extended tribal families and 
clans sitting at a powerful and lucrative nexus of land ownership, natural resource wealth, and 
political power. While northern Natives in Arctic North America are not in command of the ultimate 
levers of sovereign state power, such as military forces or national treasuries, they do have in 
their possession or within reach many tools of regional power, making them dominant regional 
elites. As the climate warms and the Arctic basin yields more natural resource wealth, the 
economic resources in their possession will also increase, and with that political influence.  
In Greenland, where the effects of global warming promise to be as profound as in Arctic Canada 
and Alaska, perhaps more so with its massive ice cap poised to retreat, just two weeks ago there 
was a non-binding referendum on increasing the island’s autonomy, and restoring sovereign 
independence, which was approved by a decisive 75% vote (nearly identical to the level of 
support enjoyed by the Labrador Inuit four years earlier.)  
Denmark has shown an openness to the possibility of Greenland becoming formally independent, 
and if this happens, it will mark perhaps the final stage in the process that began with ANCSA 
nearly forty years ago, achieved prominence (and set new limits of territorial control) in Nunavut, 
and which quietly crossed the threshold from adaptation of public structures of regional and local 
governance to the innovation and implementation of new, explicitly Aboriginal structures and 
systems that more tightly integrated the levers of economic and political power with cultural 
preservation efforts, as seen in Labrador. The land claims journey has been, and remains, a 
tremendous, albeit challenging, journey, demonstrating the staying power of the land claim 
concept, and its ability to evolve, adapt and transform—enabling the indigenous people of the 
Arctic to better balance modernity and tradition with each step along the way.  
Figure 5: Greenland: On the Road to Sovereign Independence  
 
A Warming Earth and the New Sea  
But just as the end of this long journey is in sight, with the institutional transformation of the Arctic 
nearing completion, a new challenge, and a potential strategic opportunity, emerges: that of rapid 
climate change. The visible evidence is overwhelming, as illustrated by the record ice melts 
(coming decades ahead of scientists’ predictions), the greening of the tundra as southern flora 
migrate north, and the melting of permafrost (affecting northern infrastructure and releasing 
methane trapped below, which could accelerate the warming trend.) The geophysical landscape 
of the Arctic is in a rapid transition. While this presents new economic opportunities for the least 
developed part of North America, and promises to alleviate endemic poverty with new jobs, and 
new sources of revenue for the emergent Inuit governments, there is still much uncertainty and 
risk—particularly to subsistence hunting that depends on predictable wildlife migration patterns, 
and on stable winter ice and summer ground conditions. At risk are the indigenous cultures that 
have evolved along with the unique Arctic ecosystem and all its interconnected components.  
All of the efforts, discussed above, to modernize the Arctic’s political economy over these past 
forty years have empowered the indigenous people of the region to directly address these new 
challenges, and to leverage the emerging economic opportunities—with a wide assortment of 
new tools, and increasing levels of power. While that may not be sufficient to stop or even slow 
the warming, it will at least enable the peoples of the Arctic to continue to create new solutions, 
as they rise to the new challenges of this era.  
Historical Context: North Meets South 
When considering the many dimensions of an Arctic thaw, it’s helpful to consider both the recent 
geophysical changes as well as the broader historical context, and in particular the long-term 
efforts to integrate the Arctic into the global system of states, a process under way since at least 
the 17th century, driven by both economic and strategic-military considerations. (See Fig 6, Fig 7 
and Table 1) As the Arctic thaws, many believe the region will at last fulfill its long-dreamed 
economic and strategic potential. But other observers fear a catastrophe could unfold, as climate 
change unleashes a series of destructive positive feedback cycles. Further, it remains to be seen 
whether the thawing Arctic contributes to a more peaceful world, or stimulates greater strategic 
competition and conflict; the potential is there for both conflict and cooperation.  
Over the centuries, interest in the Arctic and the commercial and strategic potential of its sea 
lanes and resources has been persistent, but climatic conditions prevented the region’s full 
potential from being achieved before now—holding back its development, and limiting its 
contribution to the world economy. This now looks to be changing—as a result of the rapid 
warming of the earth’s climate and accelerated ice melts, decades earlier than most had 
imagined could be possible.  
This puts the region in play strategically, as the historic promise of unlocking its full potential 
renews interest in the region among numerous stakeholders. How should we think of these 
changes taking place? What are the strategic implications of these changes? And what tools can 
help us navigate the choppy waters ahead?  
Navigating the Arctic Transformation: Some Metaphors and Scenarios 
During the Cold War, with the threat of nuclear apocalypse hanging over all our heads, some 
strategic theorists sought to “think about the unthinkable,” and prepare for all potential scenarios 
that might unfold. Herman Kahn, a former RAND Corporation analyst and founder of the Hudson 
Institute, was amongst this era’s most colorful and controversial thinkers, inspiring the character 
of “Dr. Strangelove” in Kubrick's popular dark comedy. One of Kahn’s books was called On 
Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, and it sought to describe the various potentialities which 
might be faced in the event deterrence failed, in order to help his readers comprehend the full 
range of strategic outcomes that might unfold.  
With the stakes of climate change so potentially high, in the Arctic and around the world; and with 
the clash between the optimists and pessimists every bit as intense as that witnessed during the 
Cold War’s doctrinal debates, a look at some metaphors and scenarios for our age makes 
considerable sense:  
1. The “End of the Arctic”—Strategic Challenges and Apocalyptic Fears  
Some have postulated that what we think of as the Arctic is actually coming to an end, and that 
we now stand at what might very be the threshold of a “post-Arctic” world. The Arctic Ocean and 
its increasingly active basin will of course still be there—more obviously so as the ice retreats. But 
its currently dominant characteristics are changing rapidly—in particular the massive, permanent, 
continent-sized barrier of multi-year ice that sits atop the pole, which could in time disappear. As 
the ice pack retreats, the polar barrier that marked the very “ends of the earth,” or what was long 
ago called “ultima thulé” has the potential to become a trans-polar crossroads, and already 
shipping experts are considering potential routes across the top of the world between Asia and 
Europe. What Rob Huebert and Brooks Yeager call a “New Sea” in their January 2008 World 
Wildlife Fund Report will soon emerge, and what was once the “ends of the earth” now has the 
potential to become its center, a profound transformation from “terra incognita” to a true 
“mediterranean.”  
The concept of a post-Arctic world is not a new one. One of the first to articulate this concept was 
Canadian journalist Ed Struzik, who authored a 1993 Equinox Magazine article titled, 
appropriately, “The End of the Arctic?” More recently, of course, is Al Gore’s “Inconvenient Truth” 
thesis which echoes Struzik’s earlier argument that we are witnessing the end of a unique part of 
the earth’s heritage. Gore goes further, suggesting a potential global catastrophe that threatens to 
end most life on our planet. Even if such an Apocalyptic end does not result from climate change, 
Arctic peoples and their governments will have to contend with the impacts of shifting wildlife 
migration patterns, coastal erosion and permafrost thaws that jeopardize much northern 
infrastructure. And even new opportunities such as increased trans-polar shipping will bring new 
risks and challenges, especially as multi-year ice breaks up and drifts south into the emergent 
sea lanes, requiring much investment and infrastructure development to ensure adequate safety, 
search and rescue, environmental cleanup, and marine service capabilities are in place.  
2. The “Age of the Arctic”—Strategic Opportunities and Hegelian Synthesis  
There are also many optimists who see us standing at the start of a new era, much like Francis 
Fukuyama viewed the end of the Cold War as a Hegelian “End of History,” and the dawn of a new 
era of hope. This more optimistic viewpoint believes we’re now entering the dawn of the “Age of 
the Arctic,” the title of the well known book and 1986 Foreign Policy article by Oran Young or as 
described by the phrase made famous in 1973 by former Alaska Governor Walter Hickel, that 
we’re approaching the “Day of the Arctic.”  
One can look even further back, all the way to William H. Seward’s 1853 “Destiny of America” 
speech that predicted the expansion of America to include “new equal States, alike free, 
independent and united” whose borders “shall be extended so that it shall greet the sun when he 
touches the Tropic, and when he sends his glancing rays towards the Polar circle.” (Seward 
helped fulfill his prediction when he negotiated the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867—
though at the time he was much criticized for “Seward’s Ice Box,” or “Seward’s Folly.”)  
3. The “New Sea”: A Modern Mediterranean?  
Whether we stand at a precipice before the tragic “End of the Arctic,” or at the gateway to the 
promising “Age of the Arctic,” depends ultimately on whether we approach the climate issue with 
hope or fear, and whether we anticipate great opportunity, or severe danger. There is an 
intriguing metaphor, one that is neither optimistic nor pessimistic but nonetheless transformative, 
that of the “New Sea.”  
A glance at a Cold War-era polar-centric map would shows the two superpowers standing face-
to-face across their common polar frontier, with the North Pole at the very center of the world. 
This would make the Arctic Ocean appear to be the modern-day equivalent of the Mediterranean 
of ancient times. But before an Arctic thaw seemed plausible, a comparison of the contemporary 
Arctic to the ancient Mediterranean would seem to overstate the case dramatically.  
Climatic conditions limited the potential for Arctic integration and development. In actual fact the 
region served more as a barrier between these two worlds—a military frontier augmented by its 
geophysical impenetrability. The DEW Line in the 1950s was thus able to establish a stable Arctic 
“Maginot Line,” or more properly a continental “trip-wire,” keeping watch over this northern frontier 
that separated the two superpowers. (See Fig 8, Fig 9)  
But with the prospect of an Arctic thaw, the “ New Sea” metaphor has the potential to redefine 
Arctic geopolitics, as the Arctic emerges as a true strategic crossroads, a literal “medi-terranean” 
or “middle of the world.” When thinking about the “Age of the Arctic,” and the promise of the 
Arctic’s future, another map comes to mind—that of a Medieval wheel map with Jerusalem as the 
spiritual, political, and strategic center of the world. Metaphorically, maps of the Arctic—during the 
Cold War, as well as today—resonate with the same sense of geostrategic centrality to the 
emerging world. But only now, with a thaw conceivable, is the region’s full potential achievable. 
(See Fig 10)  
4. Geopolitical and Perceptual Asymmetries of a Thawing Arctic  
Some basic conceptual building blocks of geopolitics are helpful to assess the implications of an 
Arctic thaw. The famed geopolitical theorist Sir Halford John Mackinder articulated a taxonomy for 
geopolitics that is still in use today—such as Heartland, Rimland, Inner- and Outer crescents, and 
his more recent Midland Ocean concept that united the Atlantic alliance. He also introduced the 
lesser-known “Lenaland” concept, which is especially important to Arctic geopolitics, named for 
Siberia’s Lena river valley, cut off from the world by climate and isolation. (See Fig 11)  
For most of human history, the Arctic has been mostly a “Lenaland,” cut off economically and 
strategically from the world. The Arctic has always presented us with a geopolitical riddle 
shrouded in ambiguity: part sea, part desert, making it at once a strategic buffer, but potentially a 
strategic crossroads. To the Russians, the Arctic is perceived to be an extension of their 
Heartland; Moscow’s assertive claims to the Arctic basin and its creative polar diplomacy in the 
summer of 2007—when it planted a flag at the polar sea bottom, setting off all sorts of alarms—
were a powerful reminder that the Arctic is considered strategically vital to Russia. As for U.S.-
Canada Arctic relations, we should also keep in mind that the Arctic composes some 40% of 
Canada’s land mass and is central to Canadian identity, from the spiritual connection to an “Arctic 
sublime” within the Canadian national identity, or a strategic recognition of the Arctic’s resources 
to Canada’s economic future, a view reflected in the “use it or lose it strategy” of Prime Minister 
Harper’s government.  
Yet only a fraction of America’s territory is Arctic, mostly neglected—and even during the battle 
for the Aleutians, America never felt truly threatened by the military occupation by our mortal 
enemy of isolated Subarctic territory and waited a year to retake Attu and Kiska. Canada, 
meanwhile, has had several diplomatic clashes with its Arctic neighbors, from the Danes over tiny 
Hans Island midway between Canada and Greenland, to various disputes with us over the 
sovereignty of the Northwest Passage. This summer, our coast guards conducted a joint mission 
in Arctic waters, recognizing that an assertive Russia is a greater threat to regional security, and 
helping to foster a more collaborative partnership on Arctic security.  
If the Arctic states have fundamentally different geopolitical perspectives on the Arctic, it could 
lead to misperceptions, escalation of conflict, perhaps even war in the worst case. With the 
advent of an Arctic thaw, the question we must ponder is how each Arctic state perceives the 
transforming Arctic geopolitics—and to be sensitive to these differences in the conduct of our 
diplomacy and military policies. Doing so will help prepare us for the road ahead, and to be ready 
for inevitable conflicts while strengthening partnerships whenever possible, prioritizing threats and 
crafting lasting friendships and alliances.  
5. New Challenges of a Rapid Ice Retreat  
The Arctic ice has been melting further and faster than predicted, and the prospect of a navigable, 
ice-free Arctic Ocean is no longer the stuff of imagination, and in 2007, a new record ice minimum 
was set, and while this past summer the ice did not retreat as far—something else did happen 
that has much metaphorical significance, and which hints at economic and strategic significance: 
the Northwest and Northeast Passages both became ice free at the same time. (See Fig 12) 
Huebert and Yeager, in their “A New Sea” report, noted the earth:  
is at the threshold of historically unprecedented ecological change. . . . The question is whether 
the arctic nations are willing and able to strengthen their existing cooperative arrangements to 
manage this transformation, conserve the critical resources of the arctic marine environment, 
while ensuring that northern peoples can benefit from the new opportunities and at the same time 
protect their traditional way of life. This is a daunting task that needs to be tackled sooner rather 
than later.  
Recent diplomatic efforts, including the Ilulissat Conference of Arctic rim states held this past May, 
suggest there is much hope for a cooperative approach to border disputes and resource 
competition. At Ilulissat, the Arctic rim states pledged their commitment to resolving Arctic 
disputes through existing international law, and to utilize the Law of the Sea Convention as the 
primary mechanism to resolve disputes over territorial boundaries. This bodes well for the future. 
So does this summer’s joint icebreaker mission between the Healy and the Louis St. Laurent, 
demonstrating the benefits of a cooperative approach between Arctic neighbors.  
But at the same time, there has been a remilitarization of the region, and increased diplomatic 
tensions between some Arctic states, especially as Russia continues to re-assert its role as an 
Arctic power. There is a risk that inter-state conflict, rather than cooperation, could intensify.  
As Michael Klare, an expert on resource conflict, has cautioned, “global warming will affect 
resource competition and conflict profoundly”—and while “global warming’s effects cannot be 
predicted with certainty . . . state collapse is a likely result along with an accompanying epidemic 
of warlordism, ethnic violence, and civil disorder.” When Russia planted its titanium flag on the 
polar sea floor, laying symbolic claim to the Pole on behalf of mother Russia last year—it quickly 
precipitated a round of reciprocal diplomatic and military moves between Ottawa and Moscow—
including the announcement of Ottawa’s new “use it or lose it” strategy for Arctic sovereignty by 
Prime Minister Harper, and his plan to develop a new High Arctic naval base, to build a new fleet 
of offshore patrol vessels to guard the entrances to the passage, and later on, to add to its heavy 
icebreaker fleet. (See Fig 13)  
6. Arctic Terror Risk  
There has been some discussion of the risk of terror, framed largely by the global nature of the 
GWOT, and there are currently some valuable targets—including the Alaska Pipeline, pumping 
stations on the North Slope, the oil storage terminal at Valdez, the steady stream of full oil-
tankers traversing the narrow waters of the Inside Passage along with vulnerable cruise ships all 
summer long, as well as a variety of soft targets associated with the summer tourist trade like the 
Alaska Railroad.  
But there are much easier, more accessible, and more plentiful targets to strike far to the south. 
In contrast to the northern region, there is a deep crisis along America’s southern frontier, with 
some 5,000 fatalities on the Mexican side from the recent round of drug wars, with drug-related 
violence seeping across the border to U.S. territory; with a rich concentration of hard and soft 
targets within sight of the Mexican border, the terror threat along our northern frontier might be 
much less salient than along our chaotic southern frontier, even as Arctic maritime activity 
increases.  
When assessing the increased risk of terror as the Arctic ice thaws, one must consider the 
relative isolation, low population density, and shortage of high-value targets offered by the region 
for terrorists. However, borders in the Arctic are especially porous, with almost no border security 
along the Alaska-Yukon boundary, so an attack is feasible, increasingly so as the climate opens 
the Arctic basin to greater maritime activity. Even after 9/11 you could hike off-season over the 
Chilkoot, without any border controls, and in mid-summer, bypassing the one border station was 
never very difficult and required a short hiking detour.  
There may be a greater risk of some sort of home-grown terror; Canada has faced numerous 
armed Native blockades, the most noteworthy being the 1990 Oka crisis, but as recently as the 
summer of 2007, Highway 401 was shut down as was the CN Rail corridor connecting Toronto to 
Montreal. But in southern Canada the Native population is under intense pressure with much of 
its historic land base gone, while in the Arctic the opposite trend has been unfolding—with Native 
land claims restoring title to much of the land base, with additional powers beyond those lands—
increasing domestic security. And with programs like the Northern Rangers further solidifying the 
relationship between tribe and state much like the Territorial Guard did during Alaska’s World War 
II and Cold War experience, it is more likely in my estimation that the indigenous people of the 
region will contribute to regional security rather than undermine it.  
7. New Thinking: An Age of Transformation  
As we think about the Arctic transformation, we should remember that this is a new chapter of 
history, with the potential for new ideas and innovation. The post-war division of Europe after 
World War II is long past, communism as a competing ideology is defeated, and as a result, the 
future Arctic need not be divided, nor become the stage for a new cold war to play out. There are 
and always will be border disputes, genuine conflicts of an economic, diplomatic and military 
nature. But there is also a chance to start fresh and forge new relations in the Arctic.  
Soviet Premier Gorbachev had such a vision for the Arctic at the Cold War’s end, expressed in 
October 1987 in his Murmansk Initiative, which called for the Arctic to become a “Zone of Peace,” 
and to lead the way forward to an end of the Cold War. But events quickly sped beyond his 
control, with the fall of the Berlin Wall more speedily integrating East and West than his Arctic 
diplomatic efforts. But the idea was a good one, and perhaps worth revisiting. At Ilulissat this past 
May, a similar vision of an Arctic united and governed by international law was asserted; it 
remains to be seen if this vision ultimately triumphs. It is possible that the Arctic basin will become 
a new arena for cooperation between Russia and the West, much as Gorbachev foresaw at 
Murmansk.  
But if Russia is going through something of a Weimar transition, with a neo-nationalist and 
imperial backlash to follow, we should be prepared for things to go the other way. But on the 
chance Russia remains committed to democracy, a pro-actively cooperative Arctic relationship 
could help to reassure Moscow that a collaborative path is possible and mutually beneficial. Just 
as the U.S. and Canadian coast guards joined forces this past summer in the Arctic to map the 
sea floor, inviting Russia to collaboratively participate in more scientific, search and rescue, and 
commercial activities, could help to transform the relationship and bury the hatchet once and for 
all. The opening of the maritime “ Arctic Bridge” linking Russia’s Murmansk Port to Canada’s Port 
of Churchill in 2007 was thus an important milestone, illustrating the potential for collaboration 
over competition. (See Fig 14)  
But much depends on the evolution of political attitudes in all of the Arctic states, and whether the 
political climate warms along with the geophysical climate. It is notable that at Ilulissat, only the 
top foreign affairs officials of the Arctic rim states were present, suggesting that even as they 
pledge to collaborate in their efforts to resolve future Arctic disputes, they have yet to fully 
integrate the input of the region’s inhabitants, and in particular its indigenous peoples. But on the 
other hand, the meeting took place in Greenland, and not a southern capital like Copenhagen or 
Washington or Ottawa; and further, it pledged to walk the path of cooperation, not conflict. Both 
are important steps forward. The next step should be to broaden the circle of stakeholders, so 
that the dynamic and creative efforts of the indigenous peoples of the region, and their many 
interests and perspectives, can help to shape the world’s response to the changes taking place. 
With the new regional governing structures across the Arctic now fully integrating the Inuit, and 
settled land claims empowering indigenous peoples with huge tracts of lands and substantial 
economic resources, their participation is not only enabled: it is essential, as the internal and 
external dimensions of Arctic security have come together at the top of our world. 
America’s New Arctic Policy: A Sea Change 
Such a shift—toward greater collaboration with and participation of the numerous tribal, national, 
and international actors on the circumpolar stage—was evident in the first comprehensive re-
articulation of U.S. national policy on the Arctic region since 1994. 
 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that among the six policy objectives identified in Section III, part A of 
National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD-
66/HSPD-25)—issued by President Bush in the closing days of his administration on January 
9th—were to “Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations” (objective 
number four) and to “Involve the Arctic’s indigenous communities in decisions that affect them” 
(objective number five.) This is historically significant, and demonstrates both an increased 
awareness of, and respect for, the growing political and economic participation of the Arctic 
peoples in governing their own affairs, as well as a continued commitment to a collaborative, 
multilateral approach to solving the region’s challenges. 
 
Also of significance: while the very first policy objective listed Section III, A is to “Meet national 
security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region,” a point that has dominated 
news coverage and commentaries on the new Arctic policy, the second objective listed is to 
“Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources,” while the third to “Ensure 
that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally 
sustainable,” which will directly benefit the foundational pillars upon which the indigenous Arctic 
cultures depend for their cultural, nutritional, and economic survival. That the sixth policy 
objective listed is to “Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global 
environmental issues” further reinforces America’s renewed commitment to multilateralism at the 
top of the world, and increasing environmental knowledge at all levels, from the local to the global, 
during this time of Arctic transformation. 
 
These important dimensions to the new U.S. Arctic policy were largely overlooked by many 
observers, in particular by the op-ed pages of several newspapers north of the border that 
emphasized the national security and unilateral dimensions of America’s new Arctic policy. For 
instance, as The Chronicle Herald opined in its January 15th editorial (“Arctic Sovereignty: No 
More Northern Lite”):  
Just a week before the White House changes hands, it has released a new policy directive on the 
Arctic that calls for a more assertive American role. The bedrock of the policy is the same—that 
the U.S. considers the Northwest Passage international waters, not Canadian domestic waters. 
But the document also calls for a stronger U.S. presence in the Arctic for economic and security 
reasons and for a resolution of Arctic border disputes so the region’s natural resources can be 
better exploited. 
The Herald also published an article on January 13th by Canwest News Service reporters Mike 
Blanchfield and Randy Boswell, titled “Bush Asserts Power Over Arctic,” which was linked to, and 
cited by Andrew C. Revkin on January 13th, in his widely read Dot Earth blog in The New York 
Times. 
 
And, in a national news story in The Globe and Mail newspaper on January 14th (“Northwest 
Passage: Harper plays down threat to Arctic sovereignty”), Katherine O’Neill reported that 
Northwest Territories (NWT) Premier Floyd Roland believes the “increased U.S. interest in the 
region is of deep concern and the federal government should respond with more than rhetoric,” 
as “too much is at stake in the Far North.” 
 
O’Neill cited Premier Roland, who told her: “Let’s not lose it for the sake of being nice. Canada 
can no longer afford to maintain a passive approach to our northern interests.” O’Neill reported 
the new U.S. policy directive “reasserts the Americans’ long-held claim that the fabled Northwest 
Passage is an international waterway, open to all. Canada argues that the route is an internal 
waterway.” She added the new policy “also states that the United States should develop a greater 
presence in the Arctic for security reasons, as well as resolve outstanding border disputes, 
including one with Canada in the Beaufort Sea, so it can tap into the region’s vast natural 
resources.” 
 
She also cited from the directive the following passage: “The United States has broad and 
fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either 
independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests.” And she quoted 
Canada's well known and deservedly influential Arctic security expert, Professor Rob Huebert 
from the University of Calgary, who “said Mr. Bush’s directive has effectively ‘thrown a grenade 
into Canada-U.S. relations’ and that it will be interesting to see what the new president does with 
it. ‘This is a very blunt statement ... they didn’t play any political niceties here.’” 
 
Somehow, the unprecedented level of collaboration that the White House has embraced—with its 
top-level commitment to indigenous as well as global participation, and its refreshingly holistic 
approach to the region’s environmental and ecological health as well as to continued scientific 
research in the interest of protecting this fragile domain—was not emphasized in the first round of 
commentary, analysis and opinion that greeted the release of the directive. 
 
Clarifying its policy, on January 13th the U.S. State Department provided a statement in response 
to a question at its daily press briefing in which it explained: “The new directive is the culmination 
of an extensive interagency review process undertaken in response to rapid changes taking place 
in the Arctic, the principal drivers of which are climate change, increasing human presence in the 
region, and the growing demand for Arctic energy deposits and other natural resources,” and 
noted the “directive focuses on seven broad areas of Arctic policy,” including:  
1. National security and homeland security,  
2. International governance,  
3. Extended continental shelf and boundary issues,  
4. Promotion of international scientific cooperation,  
5. Maritime transportation,  
6. Economic issues, including energy resources, and  
7. Environmental protection and conservation of natural resources.  
The State Department also reiterated its commitment to Arctic cooperation, noting that “States 
safeguard their national security interests in numerous ways, some on their own, and some in 
cooperation with others. The United States wants to cooperate with other governments in the 
Arctic. The best way to address both the challenges and opportunities of the Arctic is through 
cooperation. Any U.S. action would respect international law.” 
 
It is true that Sec. III, B of the directive addresses U.S. national and homeland security issues, 
and observes that “human activity in the Arctic region is increasing and is projected to increase 
further in coming years,” requiring the United States “to assert a more active and influential 
national presence to protect its Arctic interests and to project sea power throughout the region.” 
And, consequently, the directive does describe America’s Arctic national interests to “include 
such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for 
strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and 
ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight.” And, to be fair, the directive does re-assert 
America’s long-held view of the Northwest Passage as an international strait. 
 
But to take away from directive only these policy issues, and not the many others that 
demonstrate a deep commitment to multilateralism and an historically unprecedented sensitivity 
to the needs, interests, and perspectives of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic, does something 
of a disservice, and suggests an incomplete reading of the directive. 
 
For instance, Sec. III, C specifically addresses issues of international governance, noting U.S. 
participation in “a variety of fora, international organizations, and bilateral contacts that promote 
United States interests in the Arctic,” including the Arctic Council, which “has produced positive 
results for the United States,” and which also “provides a beneficial venue for interaction with 
indigenous groups.” Further, the directive urges the U.S. Senate to “act favorably on U.S. 
accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea promptly, to protect and advance U.S. 
interests, including with respect to the Arctic,” and doing so “will give the United States a seat at 
the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.” 
 
The directive calls upon American officials to “continue to cooperate with other countries on Arctic 
issues through the United Nations (U.N.) and its specialized agencies, as well as through treaties 
such as the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on Long Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution and its protocols, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer,” and to “consider, as appropriate, new or enhanced international 
arrangements for the Arctic to address issues likely to arise from expected increases in human 
activity in that region, including shipping, local development and subsistence, exploitation of living 
marine resources, development of energy and other resources, and tourism.” 
 
Additionally, Sec. III, E commits the United States to continued promotion of international 
scientific cooperation, including “the sharing of Arctic research platforms with other countries in 
support of collaborative research that advances fundamental understanding of the Arctic region in 
general and potential Arctic change in particular,” and the “active involvement of all Arctic nations 
in these efforts in order to advance scientific understanding that could provide the basis for 
assessing future impacts and proposed response strategies.” Even Sec. III, F on maritime 
transportation in the Arctic, takes a collaborative approach, across not only the various levels of 
domestic governance but well as across national boundaries, as “effective search and rescue in 
the Arctic will require local, State, Federal, tribal, commercial, volunteer, scientific, and 
multinational cooperation,” as “safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime commerce in 
the Arctic region depends on infrastructure to support shipping activity, search and rescue 
capabilities, short- and long-range aids to navigation, high-risk area vessel-traffic management, 
iceberg warnings and other sea ice information, effective shipping standards, and measures to 
protect the marine environment.” 
 
And Sec. III, G on economic and energy issues, directs U.S. officials to “seek to increase efforts, 
including those in the Arctic Council, to study changing climate conditions, with a view to 
preserving and enhancing economic opportunity in the Arctic region,” and that “such efforts shall 
include inventories and assessments of villages, indigenous communities, subsistence 
opportunities, public facilities, infrastructure, oil and gas development projects, alternative energy 
development opportunities, forestry, cultural and other sites, living marine resources, and other 
elements of the Arctic’s socioeconomic composition.” It also calls upon U.S. officials to “work with 
other Arctic nations to ensure that hydrocarbon and other development in the Arctic region is 
carried out in accordance with accepted best practices and internationally recognized standards,” 
and to “consult with other Arctic nations to discuss issues related to exploration, production, 
environmental and socioeconomic impacts.” 
 
Lastly, Sec. III, H on environmental protection and the conservation of natural resources, notes 
with concern that “the Arctic environment is unique and changing,” and that “increased human 
activity is expected to bring additional stressors to the Arctic environment, with potentially serious 
consequences for Arctic communities and ecosystems.” As with the earlier sections of the 
directive, it calls for “cooperation with other nations,” so as to “respond effectively to increased 
pollutants and other environmental challenges,” and to “continue to identify ways to conserve, 
protect, and sustainably manage Arctic species and ensure adequate enforcement presence to 
safeguard living marine resources, taking account of the changing ranges or distribution of some 
species in the Arctic.” And for those species “whose range includes areas both within and beyond 
United States jurisdiction,” it calls upon the United States to “continue to collaborate with other 
governments to ensure effective conservation and management.” It also calls upon officials to 
“seek to develop ways to address changing and expanding commercial fisheries in the Arctic, 
including through consideration of international agreements or organizations to govern future 
Arctic fisheries; pursue marine ecosystem-based management in the Arctic; and intensify efforts 
to develop scientific information on the adverse effects of pollutants on human health and the 
environment and work with other nations to reduce the introduction of key pollutants into the 
Arctic.” 
 
None of these issues suggest a go-it-alone attitude by the United States. Quite the contrary, it 
reflects an awakening to the increased participatory role of indigenous peoples, circumpolar 
neighbors, and international organizations in the management of the Arctic, and the continued 
need for a multilateral approach to managing the Arctic’s unique challenges in the years ahead.  
While the new policy does not reflect a change of perspective on the legal status of the Northwest 
Passage, or a softening in America’s commitment to freedom of the seas, it does suggest a sea 
change is underway in its perception of, and sensitivity to, the numerous challenges mounting at 
the top of the world as the ice continues its retreat, and the prospect of a post-Arctic world enters 
the realm of the possible. Most importantly, it shows a far greater sensitivity to the interests and 
perspectives of the indigenous peoples as well as America’s Arctic neighbors, and a willingness 
to work together in a joint effort to address and resolve the many challenges likely to confront the 
Arctic in the years ahead.  
Afterword: Arctic Doom... or Bloom?  
Within our lifetimes, and quite possibly before mid-century, we may witness the opening up of 
Arctic sea lanes that are fully navigable year-round. Already, seasonally ice-free sea lanes are a 
reality across much of the Arctic, a situation that just a few decades ago would have been 
unimaginable. Climate change pessimists worry about increased resource competition, coastal 
flooding, infrastructure damage from melting permafrost, changes in wildlife migration patterns, 
and stresses on some species—especially polar bears, which have evolved to thrive in the 
specific ecosystem of landfast and stable pack ice that is now melting quickly—as well as on the 
indigenous cultures of the region. 
But climate change optimists imagine a world where international shipping can take a direct 
northern route linking Asian, North American and European markets, cutting the consumption of 
fuel and reducing carbon emissions by using substantially shorter shipping routes; they foresee 
tremendous potential for maritime commerce to stimulate the economic development of Arctic 
ports, from the Port of Churchill on Hudson Bay to the depressed coastal communities of the High 
Arctic. Secure sea lanes across the top will enable shipping of strategic commodities—whether 
North Slope and North Sea oil, strategic minerals from Nunavut and the NWT, and a slew of 
Russian exports from the Kola peninsula to the Lena River basin—without the risks associated 
with current sea lanes and their vulnerable chokepoints, from the Strait of Malacca to the Panama 
Canal to the Red Sea.  
In terms popularized by Sir Halford John Mackinder, the famed theorist of geopolitics, the long 
isolated “Lenaland” along the Arctic basin will transform into a highly productive and strategically 
important “Rimland”—transforming the Arctic into tomorrow’s equivalent of the Mediterranean, a 
true strategic, economic and military crossroads of the world. As envisioned by Oran Young two 
decades ago, we will finally witness the arrival of the “Age of the Arctic.” But not an Arctic defined 
by cold and ice. Indeed, the Arctic as we have known it since classical times, is coming to an end. 
In the December 1992 edition of Equinox Magazine, naturalist Ed Struzik penned a prescient 
article titled “The End of the Arctic,” noting that with the warming of the Earth's climate will come 
the end of the Arctic as we know it. In many ways, his prediction is now coming true. While we 
can mourn the passage of an era, and the loss of a unique ecosystem, we can also celebrate the 
coming transformation. With the end of all things comes the start of something new, and in this 
case that something new may prove to be extraordinary. 
While at the top of our world sits the polar sea, at its bottom lies the ice-covered continent of 
Antarctica. As its ice cover melts, this long-isolated continent will rise from the shadows, like 
Atlantis transmigrating from imagination to reality, with all its long-hidden treasures revealed, its 
resources becoming accessible, its land mass in time becoming suitable for human habitation. As 
the human population continues to grow, and with it its appetite for natural resources, the 
emergence of this continent, and its integration into the world's political economy, may prove 
every bit as transformative as the melting of the Arctic sea ice. So while pessimists fear the 
changes that are under foot, and their many uncertainties, a more optimistic, and ultimately more 
prudent, approach would be to prepare to make the most of these new, emergent realms.  
With both poles locked in an Ice Age that never ended, the onset of an Arctic and Antarctic thaw 
promises to reunite our planet’s seas and continents, and for history to, in many ways, begin. Just 
as Fukuyama described the end of the Cold War as the “End of History” as we knew it, we once 
again find ourselves standing at the threshold of new era. Whether we think of this era as the 
"End of the Arctic," or the "Age of the Arctic," we can be sure that a brand new chapter of history 
will be written, and that it promises to be a fascinating chapter. Indeed, the possibilities range 
from the apocalyptic to the millennial. The riddle posed, but still unanswered, is whether we will 
witness an Arctic doom, or a potential Arctic bloom? 
Permafrost expert Sergey Zimov, director of the Northeast Science Station in Cherskii, Siberia, is 
deeply concerned about the potentially calamitous effects of an Arctic thaw, particularly on the 
permafrost. With climate change, he explains, eventually “the permafrost will melt to all depths,” 
though he does not expect this to take place any time soon. But when the permafrost does melt, 
“methane and methane-hydrates stored under the permafrost will be released.” But this release of 
methane trapped beneath the permafrost is not Zimov’s sole, or even his primary, concern. His 
top concern is that the “permafrost is the biggest terrestrial organic carbon storage,” 
approximately 1,000 gigatons in total, and “in the case of melting, it will get decomposed by 
microbes very quickly”—released in the form of CO2 if aerated, and as methane if in an 
anaerobic condition such as found under a lake.  
Zimov noted that “methane emission is happening all the time, mostly because of thermokarst 
lakes movement.” In our current climate, he explained, “lakes on permafrost migrate at the 
average rate of one meter per year, melting the permafrost under them. And there starts methane 
production.” But in the case of global warming, permafrost melting will result in lakes migrating 
ten times faster, consequently increasing their methane production, and this “process will 
probably become self-accelerating. The more permafrost melts, the more greenhouse gases 
released, the warmer the climate, the more permafrost melts.”  
So ultimately, “all the permafrost might melt. If the total carbon storage is 1,000 gigatons, and the 
permafrost melts in one hundred years, releasing five percent of all carbon in the form of methane, 
that gives us a one gigaton methane emission into the atmosphere” every year, for a total 
methane dump of one fifty gigatons. Zimov notes that by comparison, “the current global methane 
emission is 0.5 gigatons per year.” And while the consequences of such a release of methane are 
hard to predict, Zimov believes it will without a doubt “be one of the biggest accelerators for global 
warming.”  
A secondary methane-related risk associated with climate change has to do with methane gas 
hydrates underneath the oceans. “Under some temperatures and pressure conditions,” Zimov 
explained, “methane combined with water produces a solid form. In case of a temperature rise, 
this not very stable condition can be shifted, and methane can be released.” And if this happens, 
the “impacts are probably the same as with organic carbon decomposition,” effectively delivering 
the second part of a one-two knockout blow. These alarming results of climate change may not 
happen right away, but they do cast a long shadow over mankind’s future. But Zimov believes 
that in the near-term, the “biggest risk for the Arctic region in case of a permafrost melt is 
landscape erosion. Permafrost contains frozen water in it, in the form of ice wedges. When 
permafrost melts, the ice melts as well, and just washes away—leaving huge depressions, and a 
polygonal net of ravines.” Already, permafrost erosion has had localized impacts on infrastructure 
throughout the Arctic.  
Zimov was profiled by Reuters in September 2007: “For millennia, layers of animal waste and 
other organic matter left behind by the creatures that used to roam the Arctic tundra have been 
sealed inside the frozen permafrost. Now climate change is thawing the permafrost and lifting this 
prehistoric ooze from suspended animation.” Reuters cites Zimov, who is concerned that this “will 
lead to a type of global warming which will be impossible to stop,” as these “deposits of organic 
matter in these soils are so gigantic that they dwarf global oil reserves.” 
Professor Howard E. Epstein, an Associate Professor in the Department of Environmental 
Sciences at University of Virginia whose expertise is in the Arctic tundra, explained that 
permafrost melts concern scientists for two reasons, one quite practical but not apocalyptic, the 
other more theoretical and quite worrisome. On the more practical considerations, Epstein 
explained that engineers worry about permafrost melts for “structural reasons,” and the impact on 
northern infrastructure. Infrastructure-related impacts of a permafrost thaw have been illustrated 
in numerous dramatic photos, Epstein commented: “Well, you know, you do see these things, but 
it’s very, very difficult to know whether climate change is the proximate cause. If you see an 
individual home, sunk into the ground, it’s hard for me to say that’s a climate change effect.”  
His second concern mirrors that of Zimov, with the “release of methane that might be trapped in 
the ice,” and “the exposure of dead organic material that’s trapped in the permafrost. It’s not 
decomposing at this point, but if it were to get released from the ice, it would decompose and it 
might decompose pretty rapidly—and this is a positive feedback for carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere. The warmer it gets, the more permafrost melts, and the more carbon dioxide 
released into the atmosphere.” Epstein added, “It’s likely that some of this organic matter will 
become free from the ice and some of it will decompose back to carbon dioxide.” The amount of 
carbon dioxide that could be released into the atmosphere is potentially quite large. “‘Lots’ is an 
understatement—huge quantities. We don’t even have a good estimate. But it’s huge on a scale 
of hugeness!” As for the methane trapped beneath the frozen surface, Epstein explained, “We 
know methane is a greenhouse gas, and more potent than carbon dioxide—but the question is 
how much of this methane will get released, and how much of it will make it to the atmosphere 
before it gets consumed by some other process?” He said current research suggests that only “a 
small percentage of that methane is going to go directly into the atmosphere,” but that on the 
whole, “the methane issue is still an open question.”  
What if the geophysical transformation unfolding in the Arctic, even if profound, does not end 
apocalyptically? What if, instead of becoming a lifeless void, the Arctic enjoys a renaissance of 
life as the climate warms, and the ice melts, the region greens? Epstein’s research expertise 
includes the dynamics of tundra vegetation in response to climate change, and interactions 
among tundra vegetation, nitrogen cycling and freeze-thaw disturbances. He explained that “what 
we know from the within the scientific literature right now is that there is a general greening of at 
least the Arctic tundra,” and that the “tundra portion of the Arctic, the treeless portion, is generally 
greening,” as illustrated by data “gathered from remote sensing data. Also, there have been 
repeat photographic analyses showing that shrubs in the tundra have increased their extent and 
potentially their abundance as well. Experiments done on the ground of changing environmental 
conditions—greenhouse experiments, warming experiments, fertilization experiments—show that 
the tundra greens in response to those. This is seen largely in an increase in deciduous shrubs 
and a decline in the non-vascular plants like the mosses and the lichens.”  
Epstein observed that when it comes to climate-induced change on plant life in the Arctic, “a lot of 
what we are seeing is in the tundra. But in the sub-Arctic boreal forest, the situation is less clear. 
Papers published indicate there is a browning of the boreal forest even though the area is 
warming, and you might expect an increased in forest vegetation. One hypothesis is that warming 
is increasing the drought stress on boreal forest trees, and that is leading to a decline in the 
productivity in the boreal forest, an opposite trend to what we are seeing in the tundra. The tundra 
picture seems to be a little bit clearer than the boreal forest picture.” Looking to the future, Epstein 
notes “it is pretty unclear what is gong to happen in the long term—a few studies out there that 
have shown some changes in the latitudinal treeline, somewhat of a northward migration of 
forests, of tree species. Simulation modeling information would also show a northward migration 
of tree species. But the big question is how long something like this might take? Simulation 
modeling is only providing best guesses at this point on how long this will take—anything can get 
anywhere right away—seeds are already available wherever they need to be.” But while the 
dispersal of seeds is evident, Epstein pointed out that we must also “take into account the lag 
associated with seeds produced, and dispersed to new areas, and then to have new tree species 
coming in, and to see real changes in composition of new species coming in. We’re probably 
talking on the order of a century or more. There’s probably not going to very rapid northward 
migration of the treeline. But if vegetation already exists like the shrub case in the tundra, we will 
probably see a more rapid spread.” And in time, these changes “could very well be very huge. But 
the information that we have, the studies that we’ve done, have not been incredibly widespread in 
terms of the shrub changes. There’s some repeat photography in northern Alaska and that 
showed a lot of changes in shrubs—in riparian areas, river areas and flood plains and on gravel 
beds in rivers—and it could very well be much more widespread than we’ve actually been able to 
see.”  
Responding to the observations of the sort made by the experienced Arctic pilot Woodhead in 
The Globe and Mail, Epstein noted, “Someone who is a pilot might have some of the best views 
of it. And there is a lot of satellite data out there, but I’m not sure if anyone has analyzed all of that 
to a certain extent. But also, the satellite data don’t also give you the fine-scale view of things. It 
might have a much coarser resolution than clearly a pilot would have—so the extent of shrub 
changes might be much more dramatic than has been published in the literature right now.” While 
explaining the causes of this proliferation of shrubs in the tundra, and the gradual northward 
movement of the treeline, Epstein explained that the “soil is not becoming more fertile,” as “soil 
fertility does not change very rapidly. It changes over centuries as vegetation changes, and more 
dead vegetation is added to the soil and organic matter.” So the greening of the tundra is “not 
necessarily [from] an increase in fertility of the soil.” Rather, “what’s probably happening is soil 
microorganisms are becoming more active and decomposing more of the organic mater that is 
there, and in that process are releasing nutrients, in particular nitrogen, that is now becoming 
available for the plants.” As more nitrogen is becoming available, Epstein explained, “more 
nutrients are becoming available for plants while it might not have in the past—not the total 
amount of nutrients—just that they are potentially switching from a form unavailable to plants to a 
form that is more available, and the plants that are responding—it could be all plants are 
responding—but the ones we are likely to see are the ones that have the capacity to grow in an 
erect growth form rather than the ones that hug the ground.” And in time, Epstein observed:  
the shrubs that grow erect will continue to out-compete these more prostrate growth forms that 
don’t necessarily own the system right now—but probably share it, potentially could share it with 
vegetation that has a more erect growth form. Warming the climate could shift the balance to 
these more erect growth forms. Mosses—which dominate tundra—have no root system, and 
lichens are also very dominant in the tundra, though technically not plants. They’re an algae-
fungus symbiotic relationship. They also don’t have root systems and can’t grow very tall than 
shrubs that do grow very erect. They have a very prostrate growth form and they really do hug 
the ground—and they will potentially be out-competed. Similarly, other herbaceous grasses, 
grasses, herbs, don’t have the potential to grow very tall. All these plants would benefit from a 
warmer summer, from a longer growing season, and from more nitrogen available in the soil. The 
question is, which one has the capacity to take advantage of that the most? Since the shrubs are 
probably likely more limited now by the length of the growing season, they are likely to respond 
more to the additional warmth and the addition of days on either end of the growing season. They 
also have extensive root systems and have a greater capacity to take up nutrients that become 
available. Also, as they grow they will start to out-compete other growth forms, particularly for 
light. If shrubs, mosses, and lichens are growing, all might respond positively, but eventually the 
shrubs have the capacity to grow taller. They have wood, giving them structure. The mosses, 
though they might be responding, don t have the capacity to respond as much as the taller 
species, so the ones with more extensive root systems will benefit. Thus, there is a difference in 
the short term and the long term response. 
Arctic agriculture has been increasingly discussed in the northern press, with widespread articles 
on northern gardening programs and policy discussions relating to northern agriculture. Epstein 
reflected on the future of Arctic agriculture: “My guess is that there will be changes in the potential 
to use agriculture, and these changes are likely to occur kind of at the border of where it’s 
currently being used now. So where crops are currently growing now, the likelihood is that will 
push somewhat further north. We’re probably not going to find agriculture throughout the High 
Arctic, but at least the extent of the area that can grow crops will probably increase and push 
further north.” With global warming, Epstein explained: 
The Arctic is where the greatest warming is concentrated; the models have it projected around 
the entire circumpolar Arctic. Probably over the next century we’re likely to see increases of, the 
models are projecting, up to ten degrees Celsius in areas of the Arctic—that is unbelievably huge! 
So yes, the temperatures are going to get warmer, the snow-free season will get longer, and in 
the lower parts of the Arctic, lower meaning further south, the soils are somewhat fertile—they are 
actually very fertile, there is plenty of organic matter to grow crops. The other issue is permafrost: 
how deep do you need your crop roots to grow? Most crops are pretty shallowly rooted.  
But the case for Arctic silviculture, or tree farming, is different. “Trees would require deeper soil or 
they would require a pretty substantial melting of the permafrost, which is going to occur much 
more slowly than the earth’s temperatures will rise.” However, there is “potential very far down the 
road” for silviculture. But while there are ancient, petrified forests in the High Arctic, there is “no 
projection of anything like that happening—certainly over millions of years, tens or hundreds of 
millions of years, things like that can happen. But not over thousands or even tens of thousands 
of years.” So before we’ll see the reappearance of a forested High Arctic, “we may be talking 
about millions of years.”  
In Antarctica, in marked contrast to the Arctic, Epstein explained that “the changes are going to 
play out completely different,” and this will happen for several reasons: 
One is continent that is covered by ice surrounded by ocean, while the other is an ocean covered 
by ice and surrounded by land. So regionally the climates are very different because radiation, 
mainly incoming solar radiation, does different things when it hits ice, land, or water so that 
regional climates are completely different. The other issue that will affect the climates differentially, 
if you look at the hemisphere in general, the northern is land dominated and the southern is 
ocean dominated. Most land on the planet is in the northern hemisphere. Also, if you look at the 
latitudes that receive seasonal snow, the northern hemisphere has land at those latitudes and the 
southern hemisphere has water at those latitudes, so the northern hemisphere is where we see 
all our seasonal snow accumulation on land. 
He further elaborated, “the northern hemisphere and southern hemisphere are completely 
different form a climate perspective, different ways of influencing incoming solar radiation, 
different regional circulation of air masses and ocean waters, lots of general circulation similarities, 
but when you get into more regional aspects, they are completely different so it’s not surprising 
that one pole would be different than the other pole from the response to the increasing 
greenhouse gas concentrations.” And so, the way Antarctica will respond to climate change will 
be “completely different. So what the climate models are projecting are very, very strong 
increases of temperatures in the Arctic in the northern hemisphere,” the “projected increases in 
Antarctica are substantially less than the increases in the Arctic, so you will get much more rapid 
melting of the Arctic sea ice and also possibly the Greenland ice sheet than you will the Antarctic 
ice sheet.” Indeed, there are “definitely areas in Antarctica that are accumulating ice, and some 
losing ice—it’s unclear what will happen to the Antarctic ice sheet,” and “suggesting the whole 
thing is about to melt would be unfounded at this point.”  
Another concern climate scientists have with climate change has to do with changes to ocean 
circulation patterns and currents, including the possible shift in the Gulf Stream that might result 
in a deep freeze in Europe as the warm current changes course. Other concerns involve a 
decline in the capacity of the ocean to absorb carbon, and a potential rise in its acidity which in 
turn would harm the marine food chain. As Epstein explained: “As oceans warm they will hold 
less carbon dioxide. Colder water can hold more carbon dioxide gas than warmer water.” To 
illustrate this, he said to consider a “cup of seltzer—if you warm it, it will continue to degas, so the 
capacity of the ocean to be a sink for CO2 declines as it gets warmer. That is one issue.” Indeed, 
the repercussions of the resulting increased ocean acidification could be catastrophic to sea life, 
and in turn, all life dependent upon the sea. As noted in a June 2008 BBC News report from Paul 
Eccleston, “Traditional marine communities containing creatures such as sea urchins and snails 
are being destroyed as CO2 emissions make their environment more acidic,” and algae “vital for 
the well-being of coral reefs is also retreating.” Eccleston cites Dr. Jason Hall-Spencer of the 
University of Plymouth, who is concerned “marine food webs will be severely disrupted and major 
ecological tipping points are likely if human CO2 emissions continue unabated.” 
On changes to the oceans induced by climate changes, Epstein also observed that “the other 
issue is the circulation pattern, particularly the Atlantic pattern—people call it the conveyor belt, 
the Thermohaline circulation belt.” As he explained: 
Temperature and salinity levels lead to this circulation pattern, and warm waters from south near 
the equator move along the surface of the Atlantic up to the north, up to the Arctic ocean, which is 
why Europe is so much warmer relative to North America at the same latitude—for instance, 
England has a temperate climate where, if it was in North America, it would be a much colder 
place. The issue—the melting of the sea ice and the Greenland ice sheet would lead to an 
increase in the amount of fresh water that would go into the Arctic ocean and the increase in 
fresh water could alter these global ocean circulation patterns, or at least regional circulation 
patterns which would have rather dramatic climate effects, particularly for northern Europe. Last I 
heard, and this was from one scientist giving a talk—the projection is that there is enough fresh 
water melt to cause the circulation patterns to change, so that’s another issue to consider. The 
outcome is that these warm surface waters would no longer move from the south to the north, so 
northern Europe would get colder. 
Epstein also discussed the Greenland ice cap: “If there were a complete erosion of the ice, it’s 
going to take quite some time—I don’t know that it’s going to be a very rapid process, but who 
knows. I don’t know. We’re certainly going to see the Arctic sea ice going pretty quickly—it turned 
quite rapid last year. We’ll see what happens this year. Greenland looks like it is losing more ice 
than it is accumulating, and if there are enough feedbacks, then the melting of the Greenland ice 
sheet could accelerate. But at this point, there is a lot of ice there, and it would take some time for 
it to disappear.” Epstein noted, with regard to volumes of ice: “The Antarctic volume is four to five 
times greater than the Greenland volume,” but he added that he’s “not sure about Arctic sea ice” 
in comparison. But, when it comes to “melting and sea levels, if you’re concerned about the sea 
level rise, it’s Greenland and Antarctica. If the Greenland ice sheet melts, global sea levels will 
rise by six meter. If the Antarctic ice sheet melts, it would be an additional twenty-eight meters. 
We would lose a lot of land, a good chunk of land, with those kinds of sea level rises. But those 
are the extremes though.” As for how long for the ice to melt, for the “ Greenland ice sheet, it 
could be centuries. It could be a century, to centuries.” As for the “Antarctic, who knows if it’s 
even melting.” Because of the structural asymmetry between the northern and southern 
hemisphere, the rapid ice melt in the Arctic may well not occur in the Antarctic, and if a net melt 
happens, it will be much slower. And when the ice cap melts, what might be revealed? “For 
Greenland, and Antarctica, It’s rock—and anything that was organic underneath is probably rock 
now.” So that means a long time before we see productive soil forming: “We are talking millions, 
tens of millions, of years, maybe even hundreds of millions. Tens of millions maybe” more likely 
“before we’re talking primary succession, before any ecosystem would develop from scratch.”  
As for the potential for human habitation in the thawing polar regions, Epstein commented: 
“Humans can live anywhere they want, we can live in Antarctica if we want. You have to bring a 
lot of food and resources from elsewhere,” but it’s nonetheless possible. But there is potential that 
“lots of subsistence peoples, reindeer herders, subsistence hunters of caribou, whales, and sea 
life,” could adapt to a newly emergent post-ice cap Greenland or Antarctica. “So, there are 
different options for subsistence in the Arctic. But why don’t you see that in the Antarctic? It’s a 
different environment, and I think it’s a geographic issue. Another part of it, there is no land—well, 
there are really no land plants or herbivores to speak of, really only marine life there, so it would 
have to be Eskimo-like people, people who live on ocean life. But it’s definitely a harsher 
environment out there, and it was also less accessible.” So among the first permanent residents 
of a newly uncovered interior of Greenland or Antarctica would “probably have to be fishing 
cultures to start off. There won’t be much else there.”  
But even if this happens, it won’t happen any time soon: “The only thing is a lot of the things you 
are talking about are either not going to happen or we’re talking about some very long time scales. 
The things we are concerned with are the sea ice melting, which is going pretty rapidly, 
vegetation changes in the Arctic, some reduction of permafrost, and rapidly changing 
temperatures in the Arctic.” As for the changes that will happen along “longer time scales,” or the 
more “questionable changes” that are occasionally speculated about, these would first come to 
pass “in Greenland, with the ice sheet” and then with “changes in ocean circulation patterns.” And 
finally, ages from now, “even further out, there are changes in the Antarctic.”  
Just as the Greenland ice cap may eventually disappear, allowing that giant island to fulfill the 
promise of its name, much of the Arctic will one day open up to human habitation and 
development, eventually sustaining agriculture, and later silviculture—though not for many 
generations, perhaps even centuries or millennia. But as this transformation takes place, the 
carrying capacity of the Arctic will expand, so that more and more people can call it home. This 
will create a new immigration opportunity for the Arctic states, which are now sparsely populated 
along their northern edge. People from poorer nations to the south may find compelling economic 
or political reasons to emigrate, and help the Arctic achieve its development potential as its ice 
cap thaws. This will no doubt create tensions with its original inhabitants, testing their hard won 
protections enshrined in their land claims and self-government accords, and pitting their interests 
against those of the newcomers to their land, much as happened in the Yukon at the end of the 
nineteenth century during the Klondike Gold Rush, and in Alaska during World War II and the 
early Cold War, and in the Northwest Territories during the diamond rush of the 1990s.  
While Nunavut and much of Greenland have yet to experience their own demographic invasions, 
they are enjoying surges in exploration activities, onshore and offshore. As the climate continues 
to warm and the Arctic continues to thaw, such a movement of peoples from the south to the 
north seems inevitable. Many new political structures are now in place to intermediate these 
pending conflicts, as a result of the hard work of land claims negotiators from Alaska to Nunavut, 
giving the Inuit and other northern Native peoples tools that were not available during earlier 
episodes of north-south contact, such as during the Yukon gold rush, or the earlier Russian 
colonization of Alaska or British colonization of Rupert’s Land. These new structures will help to 
buffer the changes that are forthcoming, and to mitigate the many risks and uncertainties faced 
by the peoples of the North as the prospect of a post-Arctic world becomes more plausible. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
Maps and Figures  
 
Figure 6: Early Colonization of the Arctic and Subarctic 
 
Left: Rupert’s Land was granted to the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1670. It was sold to Canada, 
becoming part of the NWT, in 1867. Right: Russian explorers first viewed Alaska in 1732, with 
landfall being made in 1741 during Vitus Bering’s expedition, and its first colony was established 
in 1784 on Kodiak Island.  
Figure 7: Modern War Makes its Way North  
  Left: The Shenandoah in pursuit of Yankee whalers in Bering Sea in June 1865, destroying much 
of the fleet—even as the war came to an end. Right: The Japanese bombed Dutch Harbor in 
June 3, 1942, and seized the islands of Attu and Kiska a few days later.   
Figure 8: Cold War ASW Activities Heat Up the Arctic Theater  
 
 
 Above: In August 1958, the Nautilus transited the Arctic basin and in March 1959, the Skate 
surfaced at the pole. Bottom: On its August 1970 surveillance mission, the Queenfish explored 
thousands of miles of the Siberian Arctic.  
  Above: The route of the Queenfish, bringing us into the era of Arctic submarine and ASW 
operations.  




Figure 10: Maps, Metaphors, and an Arctic Mediterranean  
 
  
Figure 11: Arctic Geopolitics: From “Lenaland” to …? 
 
Figure 12: Record Ice Melts Turn Dream of the Northwest Passage into Reality  
 
 
Top: 2007 Ice Melt. Bottom: 2008 Near-Record Ice Melt.  
Figure 13: A Thawing Arctic Precipitates a Resource Rush, with Diplomatic and Military 
Repercussions  
 





Table 1: Clash of Civilizations: Colonial Expansion, War and Conflict in the Arctic  
The ongoing integration of the Arctic into world politics has been taking place over several 
centuries, and includes several historically significant events:  
15th to 21st Century:  The long quest for the elusive Northwest Passage, 
imagined as far back as the 15th century, and which 
gained momentum in the 18th and 19th centuries, and 
which was of intense interest to the British Navy, 
particularly during interwar periods; in recent years, the 
Passage has become ice-free in summer with 
increased commercial usage.  
17th to 19th Century:  The colonization in Russian-America (1741-1867) and 
Rupert’s Land (1670-1869), a result of both the 
commercial expansion of European powers and their 
strategic military and economic competition.  
19th to 20th Century:  The rise of commercial whaling, which brought 
Nantucket and New Bedford whalers into the Beaufort 
and Bering Seas in the 19th century, followed briefly 
during the dying days of the Civil War by the 
Shenandoah—as the Confederacy sought to destroy 
the Yankee whaling fleet in the final days of the war. 
(This was the Arctic’s first oil boom, and one of its first 
resource wars.)  
World War II:  The 1942 Japanese invasion of the Aleutians, bringing 
the Pacific War to American territory, and 
demonstrating the strategic significance of Alaska to 
the modern world.  
Cold War:  The bipolar division of the polar region during the Cold 
War, and the region’s emergence as an important 
theater for submarine and ASW operations, and for 
strategic early-warning along the DEW Line.  
Post-Cold War:  The post-Cold War geopolitical and climatic thaw 
brings us to the current era of renewed economic 
activity in the Arctic basin, with increasing military and 
diplomatic tensions between the Arctic states in 
response to a resurgent Russia.  
Ongoing:  There has been an ongoing process of increasing 
political and economic integration of the Arctic’s 
indigenous peoples, culminating in the 1999 formation 
of the Nunavut Territory, with some aspiration for even 
greater political autonomy approaching formal 
independence occasionally articulated—as 
demonstrated during the November 26, 2008 non-
binding referendum on Greenland’s autonomy, 
approved decisively with a 76% yes vote after a very 
high turnout of 70%. In response to these domestic 
pressures, most of the Arctic rim states have modified 
their assertions of sovereignty—engaging with the 
region’s indigenous peoples and building new, 
inclusive systems of economic and political 
management.  
 
